5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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gift exchange differs to some extent from the Western exchange of Christmas presents with which it is sometimes compared. In the former, as opposed to the latter system, the acquisition of desired scarce resources is a most important consideration; the fostering of social relationships is equally important in both systems. 431

Westerners often criticise Melanesians for being too grasping and mean in gift exchange. Absurd though this criticism may seem, it arises from a real cultural difference: Westerners depend on institutions other than gift exchange for the acquisition of desired scarce resources. Hence the institution of exchanging Christmas presents need serve no other end but the fostering of social relations. For the Melanesians, with a rudimentary market system, gift exchange must serve economic as well as social ends. This lack of differentiation leads to the necessary consequence that social exchange is rarely effective unless prestations of economic value are exchanged between the partners and both sides are satisfied with what they receive. 431 436

Orokaiva regard exchange relations as the *causa efficiens* of social relations; they cannot envisage any significant social relations in the absence of exchange relations and they ascribe all breakdowns in social relations to an antecedent breakdown in exchange relations. They support this view with cogent and sophisticated arguments, which will be presented throughout this work. Here, I shall quote only a few examples of their reasoning so as to give it some *a priori* plausibility. 431 436 829

One evening a women's dance practice was interrupted by an angry man calling his wife to come home. It turned out that his son's wife, who lived with the couple, had run off and returned to her village. The immediate cause of this escape was clear: he had tried to seduce her. He considered himself entirely justified in doing so as the young woman belonged to his son. To which his wife retorted that the son was hers also. The loss of the young woman, for whom bride price had been paid and whom the son would certainly expect to be reserved for him, was very serious and led to a meeting involving his clan, his wife's clan and the son's wife's clan. This meant that all of Sivepe was there, as well as a number of people from neighbouring Sasembata, the son's wife's village. A councillor was invited to adjudicate. The Sasembata people's arguments were interesting but not relevant here. The meeting was mainly concerned with what was regarded as the key problem: the conflict between the older couple. Their marriage had been unhappy for some years. The wife had been away to Port Moresby for a long time; when she returned the husband had gone away, also to Port Moresby. When he came back he found his wife was having an affair with another man. He himself was constantly chasing his three daughters-in-law. 581 586 627

The meeting addressed itself to the question of what had caused this marriage breakdown. The husband had been wrong to pursue his daughters-in-law; the wife had been wrong in committing adultery, and so on. But how did it begin? Why had the wife gone to Port Moresby in the first place? So she told the tale. She had had diarrhoea; her husband had become angry. But she kept on going out of the house. She then took some of his betelnuts to chew, and he told her in a fury that he did not want her to go to his garden any longer. She did not get food for a day and a half and then left for Port Moresby.

No further questions were asked. Once the husband had confirmed this

account, the meeting ruled that the cause of the marriage breakdown was the husband's refusal to allow her to enter his garden. The attempted seduction, the adultery, the escapades to Port Moresby, the violent words and acts that had characterised the marriage over the years were all declared to be blameworthy, but the most serious of the offences was the husband's act in denying his wife entry to the taro garden. This signified the breaking off of the basic exchange relation in a marriage whereby the man clears the garden, the wife harvests the taro, and cooks it, and the husband and wife both eat it. I was told that when this exchange relation is broken, the marriage itself breaks down.

Why it is the taro garden where exchange between husband and wife is so important will be discussed in Chapter VI. I am concerned here to show that in tracing the cause of a marriage breakdown, what the Orokaiva seem to be looking for is evidence of a breakdown in the area of gift exchange. As long as the husband still gives his wife taro, there may be considerable difficulties between them, but these are not *defined* as a breakdown in Orokaiva culture unless there is a breakdown in Obligatory exchange.

Another such case was that of a man who took sides in a quarrel between his brother and another man who had been trying to rape, i.e. seduce by force, that brother's wife. I thought that the village generally would be on the brother's side, as rape is disapproved of, but almost everyone took the side of the rapist and the man who took the side of his brother had to leave the village. The man who was expelled had a long history of trouble making. During my stay he had been involved in every fight except those between husbands and wives. He had also committed rape, his victim being a prohibited partner under the incest rules. His trouble was, so I was told, that no woman wanted him. I asked my informants why this was. The reason was that he had been married previously, he had maltreated his wife and she had run away. Now nobody would help him. And why would nobody help him? Well, brideprice had been paid for his first wife; it had been lost through his fault, and that was the 'real' reason why nobody supported him in the quarrel. Here again we notice that the cause of the trouble was the breakdown of an exchange cycle. When a man has been helped in paying brideprice he has an obligation towards his clansmen to hold his wife, raise a family and be a support for the others. He must manage the relationship with his own affines properly and make them into valuable exchange partners.

In both instances a basic exchange cycle had been broken and that was thought to constitute the essence of the relationship. In the first case this was the exchange between man and woman in making their own contributions and deriving their own benefits in the taro garden – a cycle of exchange which parallels the cultivation cycle of the taro itself. In the second case it was the exchange between clansmen which is complete only when the man who received the brideprice provides recruits for the clan, as well as a steady new affinal alliance. It does not concern me here whether psychologists would, in such cases, accept the exchange breakdown as the real cause of the social breakdown; I have illustrated that the Orokaiva view social breakdowns in this manner.

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423 425 611 from a patrilineal norm are so frequent that it is unusual for any man to hold precisely the same blocks as his father who was *enda mama* before him. Nor do clan boundaries and village boundaries remain unchanged for any length of time. In themselves, such departures from patrilineal ideology do not in the least reduce the usefulness of a descent model for the explanation of Orokaiva land tenure, providing that we can plausibly regard all departures from the patrilineal rule as random responses to the vicissitudes of life. In the past, some New Guinea ethnographers have proceeded from this assumption, whereas others (e.g. Lawrence 1967) were willing to recognise structural regularities in the transfer of land to persons other than agnates:

> The potential social relationships which can be deduced from titles to land are of great theoretical importance. They represent an interlocking system of rights and obligations which can reinforce purely biological relationships (those of kinship and descent) within the security circle. (Lawrence 1967:114)

428 423 425 The first question that needs to be resolved, in the case of the Orokaiva, is whether there is really a *rule* enjoining a man to leave his land to his sons (if he has any). I found the rule to be much more ambiguous. If a man has sons, he is expected to leave them *at least half* his land, but he is free to dispose of the other half to others – sisters, daughters, adopted children, for example. Thus a degree of freedom of disposition *is built into the Orokaiva system.* The many cases of non-patrilineal inheritance quoted by Rimoldi, and others I could add, are therefore not exceptions to a rule but the operation of a rule clearly stated by informants. In this discussion, I shall first show on a purely empirical basis that some land transfers are explained by a principle of descent and others on the principle of what Lawrence calls reinforcement of relationships within the security circle. Next, I shall investigate how far the transactional model developed above can provide a principle of higher generality which will sufficiently explain *all* land transfers, patrilineal and other. In the present section I shall concentrate on transfers within the patrilineage.

596 423 [554] We have seen earlier in this discussion that the obligation to 'look after' a plot of land formally arises out of an arrangement between an individual (a newly born child) and an ancestor. In practice, however, the ultimate responsibility falls on the head of the extended family, the 'father of the ground' (*enda mama*). This *enda mama* inherits his title from his father or elder brother who died before him. If he has sisters, younger brothers, children or grandchildren, all [769] these will regard him as *enda mama.* Thus, the death of an individual will not affect the performance of the obligation to ancestors living on the land, as the *enda mama* will either discharge these obligations himself or appoint some other occupier to carry them out.

596 Politically, the *enda mama* acts as leader of his group both externally and internally. In external disputes he champions members of his group against the claims of outsiders. This role is an exceedingly important one and many examples are given where a young man who had a perfectly valid claim to land could not take possession of it because he had nobody to 'speak for him'. (His [627] father was dead.) Internally, in conflicts between members of the extended family, the word of the *enda mama* is final. Nobody outside the family can

In five blocks rights were obtained by a man by adoption from two previous rightholders neither of whom had any surviving male children, and each of whom adopted this man in turn during his childhood. The two men belonged to different lineages. Another six blocks belonged to the Paru lineage which died out due to an absence of male heirs. The rights in five of these lands fell to a female member of the lineage and from her to a relative in a neighbouring village (the precise relationship is not known). His descendants transferred the rights back to a relative of theirs in the Jego'undi sub-clan of Inonda. It appears that individual rights are not retained for long if the holder is permanently resident elsewhere. Rights to the sixth block of Paru lineage land passed through a Paru female to her son in the Joremba'embo lineage of his father. It will be noted that Inonda lands have changed from one lineage to another firstly by adoption of a member of another lineage and secondly by transmission to the son of a female of the donor lineage. Such instances only occurred when there were no resident males in the direct line.

When a male is born to a current rightholder the child immediately becomes a potential joint rightholder in his father's land. His rights crystallize when he plants his first garden, usually at the time of his marriage. People claim that the first-born child has no rights superior to those of any other, but in the case of joint rightholding at least, he is recognized as senior, and as the spokesman and trustee in negotiations involving other groups. There were insufficient instances of brothers holding gardening land jointly to ascertain the precise nature of the elder brother's rights of control.

The enforcement of rights

In pre-contact times rights could be enforced by recourse to negotiation or arbitration by elders within the village, by direct aggression or by recourse to sorcery. Today direct aggression is illegal, and though it still occasionally occurs between individuals or small groups, it is no longer a very important deterrent. Sorcery is still widespread and the fear of it appears to be an effective deterrent to encroachment on the rights of the strong, though not necessarily on those of persons whose status is low. In the event of encroachment by another

villager it is said that the aggrieved party will place his erahu on the path leading to the land concerned as a warning to the offender. If he does not take heed the aggrieved will have recourse to sorcery or physical violence, or he may (less commonly) bring it before the assembled men of the village. If all are agreed on a course of action but the offender refuses to comply, he may be evicted. Two men of the subordinate subclan were threatened with eviction for alleged theft of produce shortly before our arrival. No further thefts occurred.

At present the only body with effective power to settle disputes is the Department of Native Affairs to which the people frequently have recourse. Just prior to our arrival one man had reported another villager for animal trespass and damage to his crops. The matter was settled by an informal payment of damages arranged in the presence of a member of the official patrol staff.

Current problems in relation to the enforcement of rights are discussed on pages 76-77.

assistance. The system of investigation followed by the Commission is very detailed, and accordingly in the period of three years since the Commissioner was posted to the district only about five disputes have been settled. Already 34 other cases are awaiting deliberation and many other disputants would take their cases to the Commission if an early decision was possible. Owing to the lack of staff it will probably be many years before they can be heard. The scale of the problem appears to be so vast that it may well be beyond the capacity of the Commission to cope with for many years to come.(1) To overcome the problem in a short time would require either tremendous expansion of the Lands Commission or delegation of authority to deal with such matters to local (and possibly indigenous) tribunals.(2)

In the meantime the area is left without adequate machinery for the definition of rights and the settlement of disputes. Indigenous leaders, whether councillors, clan heads or other elders have no legal right to determine disputes, and although they are frequently able to exert social pressure to have their decisions enforced, they cannot apply any legal sanctions. It seems that such decisions are frequently effective within the lineage or sub-clan because the leaders are in intimate contact with the disputants and can apply effective social sanctions. This is much less so with respect to disputes be-

(1)- Since this article was written, the Native Lands Commission has been joined with the existing Land Titles Commission to form a new Land Titles Commission. The enabling legislation (Land Titles Commission Ordinance 1962) was passed by the legislature in 1962 but was not assented to by the Governor General until April 1963. The new Commission has only seven commissioners to serve the whole of Papua and New Guinea.

(2) This is a widespread pattern elsewhere in the Pacific. For example, in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the Lands Commission is composed entirely of indigenous members, though the Chief Lands Commissioner (who is an expatriate official) sits with them on appeal cases. The Lands Commission in Fiji is comprised of a commissioner (who is usually a Fijian) and a number of Fijian assessors who are elected for the particular area by the Provincial Council. The Land and Titles Court of Western Samoa is comprised of a President (who is also Chief Judge of the High Court), not less than two Samoan judges and not less than one assessor. In practice, however, it more frequently sits with three Samoan judges and two or more assessors who are usually Samoans.

657 been at Ombi-Tara, in favour of briefer parties which distract less
423 from market oriented activities.[1]

182 There was verbal evidence at Ombi-Tara of further rejection of
[829] old customs since the introduction of tenure conversion. Informants often suggested that conversion marks the beginning of a new life - 'Before we were not using our land well but now we are changing everything and we will live better'. Several previous innovations in the Northern District have been greeted in like fashion (see Belshaw 1951:249, and Crocombe 1964a:29-32).

[622] Leadership in the traditional societies of Papua-New Guinea is
[554] generally not inherited but achieved through personal excellence in economic and political organisation and the main activities of the society including a knowledge of land tenure arrangements. It
[614] was decided by the members of the Mumu clan that their clan leader was too old to understand and adapt to the new land system. His son was not considered clever enough to succeed him and eventually the thirty-five year old son of the leader's brother was chosen as successor.

[621] The introduction of tenure changes tends to favour younger men who no longer need to defer to their elders for cash crop land. Tenure conversion at Ombi-Tara may also affect the balance of 'informal' authority in the area by altering the balance of land rights. Before conversion some individuals had rights to consider-
[556] ably larger areas of land than others. This was of some significance in determining status and prestige. Since conversion, each individual has rights to twenty acres of land. The long-term effect of this equalisation on social organisation and informal status and prestige systems may be of some significance.

[614] The functions of the clan leader are little changed by the new
[627] tenure system. As before, he has no jurisdiction over land held by individuals. He previously had limited authority to intervene if one man planted on another's land without permission and under the new system can prevent one man planting behind another's block. He is charged with preventing people from other clans or other areas planting on his clan's land in much the same way as before tenure conversion, with the difference that now his jurisdiction in this matter applies only to the clan land outside the blocks.

Obligations

571 Mutual assistance and mutual obligation patterns provide a system of social security, a form of institutional safeguard

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[1] Similar changes have been reported in another Orokaiva area by Crocombe (1966:71-2) and Hogbin (1966:81-3).

353 *tapa* cloths, also worn on ceremonial occa-
[415] sions; often nowadays mother's best dress and father's best shorts and shirt are also kept in this box. Everyday tools—fishing spears, pig spear, bush knife, and axe—are stored between the floor joists under the floor platform. A
[372] bundle of dry firewood may be stored under the house in case of a prolonged spell of wet
[227] weather. The dwelling of each clan fishing-leader is easily recognized by the large seine net hung to dry under the eaves or rolled in a corner of the verandah.

342 The Yega build one other form of dwelling, a garden shelter (*dobo*) usually roughly constructed with leaf walls, frequently open at one end and often so low from floor to roof that a person cannot stand erect in it. A *dobo* is a temporary dwelling, built near the swidden in current use, and used by a man and his family for up to a week at a time while they are working in their gardens, which may be three or four miles from the village. The *dobo* is also used to shelter from rain or to take a siesta during shorter, one-day visits to the garden.

343 A *gaga* is simply a talking platform where
[461] men sit for a chat, a chew (of betelnut) or a
[614] smoke during siesta time, or after the day's work is done. There is usually at least one *gaga* for each clan in a village. The *gaga* per-
[627] forms an important social function for it is here that quarrels are settled, marriages arran-
[584] ged, and the everyday problems and business of the village discussed and finalised.

291 Everyday clothing is a pair of shorts and maybe a shirt or a singlet for boys and men, and a cotton dress or skirt for girls and women.
[287] The traditional body covering for both men and women was beaten out bark-cloth of the paper mulberry tree. This is used throughout
[171] the Pacific and is known as *tapa*. *Tapa* skirts and loin cloths are still worn on special occasions, such as weddings and New Year sing-sings, while many older people wear *tapa* to
323 church on Sundays. The Yega and their neigh-
[289] bours are expert tapa-makers but they did not have either the suitable clay or the art of pot-
439 making. They used to trade their *tapa* for pots from Ambasi, thirty miles to the north, and
[178] from Wanigela, 100 miles to the south. This trade has now declined because everybody can

[P.11-A) [TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 12-A]

621 622 625 614 manageable size. Jovareka was definitely not a hereditary leader in Sivepe; in fact, he was not even born there. On the other hand, the two men he saved belonged to the leading family of the Seho clan, which is the dominant clan of Sivepe. In the circumstances, the law of reciprocity demanded that the Seho clan backed Jovareka as a suitable man to be village constable. His status was accordingly greatly enhanced.

625 The scope of his role, however, may easily be exaggerated. According to Samuel, he was put through a course of training of one day. He was told about how to take a case to court and how to get and give evidence. He was told not to belt anybody, but handcuff them. He had to check that houses were built properly, that sago roofs were replaced and lavatories built. He also had to see that the men cut the grass in the village and the women swept, and that the road built by the government was properly maintained. Each village had its own stretch of road to look after, and this was subdivided into sections for each of the men. This summary tallies [364] with the statements of other informants. We note that some of the included items (such as the women sweeping the village, the replacement of old sago roofs) are traditional activities and hardly required police supervision. Other of the included items, such as the building of lavatories, remained a dead letter until after the eruption, and it was not until 1965 that all houses actually had lavatories. [754] Furthermore, it is only now, with the fear of sorcery diminishing under the impact of Christianity, that anyone would dare to use a lavatory.

I asked Samuel whether he had ever handcuffed anyone or had anyone jailed. No, he had never used the handcuffs. He had never brought anyone from Sivepe to court. He had sent people from other, surrounding villages to court. Tax was never collected past Sangara in his day, he said, implying that his record would not have been so serene if he had had to collect the head tax. Two Sivepe men had actually been taken to court during his period of office, but not by him; it was done by a visiting patrol, for not tending the roads, but they were let off as they had just returned from a period of plantation work. Other Sivepe informants told me that the village constable made little difference to the way of life of the people and this must, I think, be conceded. Nonetheless, Samuel was evidently called in as [627] a mediator in quarrels in other villages and due to his influence, some cases went to court.

625 731 The evacuation camp seems to have placed a heavy burden on the village constables as they were the middlemen between government and the village people, responsible for the distribution of food and supplies and the setting up of village organisation in the camp. The camp consisted in fact of a number of villages, closely together, in which the village constable was much more in charge than he ever had been. Permission to go back to the home area to check whether possessions had remained undisturbed and to collect food, also had to be given through the village constable who was put in charge of all such

693 The councillor, the court and the police are only a last resort in serious quarrels. I saw a councillor enter a dispute once, playing a
● 627 mediating role between disputants from two villages, but without playing more than an advisory role. One quarrel was taken to court, but this was not a case where traditional mechanisms of social control
683 had failed. A woman accused her husband of adultery with one of the
626 new Garombi arrivals. She and the husband fought and had to be separated as the lady had an axe; the domestic dispute soon died down but the Garombi woman laid a complaint for slander with the police. Before this came to court, the wife had been roundly condemned by almost everyone in the village; she had repented, had gone round the village to signify her regrets, and been as contrite as her pride could possibly allow her to be. The court let her off with a reprimand. The episode, far from suggesting a flagging of Orokaiva traditional social control, had demonstrated to me that it was still effective.
177 Nonetheless, the Orokaiva, as so many other peoples in contact with
627 Western civilisation, have been quick to see the advantages of a judicial system providing an impartial arbiter in disputes, to whose decisions both parties will defer. At the moment, this western judicial system is an additional resource of Orokaiva law, without undermining its existing institutions.

felt toward the exchange partner, fear of the trouble he might cause, instrumental benefits he has to offer, the importance of the partner in the total exchange network, and so on.

Anger, in this Orokaiva philosophy, is a normal attitude toward a partner with whom one stands, for the time being, in a relation of negative reciprocity. An exchange of injuries takes place until peace is made by the offer of an appropriate gift and feast. The anger of Sumbiripa does not completely fall into this pattern because here the exchange relationship is somewhat limited in scope. Sumbiripa's gift to man is the safe confinement of the dead, whereas man's gift is merely the avoidance of any disturbance of Sumbiripa's mountain. Man mediates the relationship by sending his dead to Sumbiripa; Sumbiripa mediates it by emitting his usually innocuous rumbling. Before 1951, Sumbiripa was not known by Orokaiva to have ever erupted. Hunting on the mountain and similar infractions were believed to have broken the exchange relationship and th[illegible]aroused Sumbiripa to a just reprisal.

Sumbiripa's anger was righteous not only because he was a god. In the framework of Orokaiva thought, serious anger is normally regarded as righteous, at least among persons standing in a regular exchange relationship. If anger expresses itself in verbal abuse or physical violence it is not serious, but it becomes so if misfortunes occur because of sorcery imputed to the person who is wronged. The successful magical expression of anger proves that anger to be well founded. A man may of course decide to use countermagic, and if that works the anger is no longer serious. If countermagic does not work, a man must be ready to acknowledge his fault and make reparations.

In such a dispute it is of course relevant which side has broken a rule, but the rules are most often debatable. In the end nothing is considered worse than to have made another person seriously angry. Prudence demands that seriously angry persons should be mollified, unless their kinship and physical distance is such that they can be defined as enemies. But even between enemies, a time comes when anger is shown by magical and other misfortunes to become inexpedient.

Self-accusation and self-inflicted injury are a regular part of this system. In order to make peace a person must define himself as the transgressor (Schwimmer 1970a, n.d.), as the Papuans did in the 'anger of God' explanation. Self-injury is a regular strategic

weapon, since the person who cuts down his own tree to injure himself shows anger about a hostile act perpetrated by some unnamed person. He thus makes a claim for community sympathy and possible restitution (Williams 1940). Self-accusation is a form of self-injury and therefore at once places an obligation on the *sufferer* of the supposed original injury. In this sense an acknowledgment of guilt by Orokaiva would place some obligation on Sumbiripa or God to forgive them. Thus we can never ignore the transactional element in what is manifestly a sincere state of contrition.

It is far more complicated to explain the anger of the Christian God, and people's belief in it, than to explain the anger of Sumbiripa. At the time of the eruption, few Orokaiva had been baptized, whereas it was precisely in Sangara territory that the mission was well established and had many adherents. Most of the persons who thought they had been punished by God were actually still pagan, which strictly should have put them out of reach of his wrath. We need to reconstruct as best we can what kind of exchange relationship was deemed to exist in 1951.

We can appraise this only if we consider briefly the total system of relationships of the Orokaiva within the colonial macrosystem, namely the social unit comprising Orokaiva, mission, government, and traders. Theories about the punishment of God referred not only to Orokaiva neglect of the mission but also neglect of instructions and advice given by the government. The traders were never mentioned.

One common characteristic of government and mission is that both institutions believe they are the Papuans' benefactors and say so on many occasions. In particular, it is on these supposed benefits that they base any moral claims they make on the Orokaiva. When the eruption occurred it was therefore reasonable, from the Orokaiva viewpoint, to conclude that their slowness in satisfying the claims of government and mission had aroused in them great anger and that God, who manifestly was looking after the white authorities, acted as agent of the punishment.

In exchange relations it is a fixed policy to satisfy the claims of important partners first and be much slower about the others. The fact that the whites, in spite of their immense wealth, had a fairly low partnership ranking is not difficult to explain. If we glance at the kind of interaction typical of the years 1900 to 1950, we find